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Apartments in the Suburbs:
In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh
ROBERT M. WASHBURN*
I. The Girsh Case-Background
A. The Facts
B. The Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
2. The Concurring Opinion
3. The Dissent
II. The Analytical Framework
A. The Suburban Ethic
B. General Welfare Analysis and the Population Exclusion
Rationale
1. From Bilbar to Kit-Mar
2. Girsh and Precedent
3. General Welfare v. Population Exclusion
C. The Question of Remedies
III. Conclusion: The Future of Suburban Housing
A. Equal Protection and Low-Income Suburban Housing
B. Regional Zoning and the Municipalities Planning Code
C. The Bounds of Permissible Exclusionary Zoning
D. The Bounds of Reasonable Regulation
On February 13, 1970, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
cided In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh.1 The court, reasoning that
* A.B. 1966, Rutgers University; J.D. 1968, Washington University.
Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). For ease of reference, the ap-
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suburban municipalities cannot employ zoning techniques to avoid
the burdens of population expansion, held unconstitutional a zon-
ing code which excluded apartment houses. Since this holding
goes beyond the traditional property rights analysis and approaches
the argument of equal protection in land use decisions, it will
have an impact far beyond the borders of Pennsylvania.
This Article will review the Girsh decision and analyze it
within the context of prior exclusionary zoning cases in Pennsyl-
vania. It will also examine some implications of the decision
concerning the future of suburban land development and urban-
suburban resource allocation.
I. THE GIRSH CASE- BACKGROUND
A. The Facts
On July 13, 1964, Joseph Girsh, an experienced home and
apartment builder, contracted to purchase 17.7 acres of vacant land,
known as the Duer Tract, in Nether Providence Township, Delaware
County, Pennsylvania. The land is located at the intersection of
Turner Road and the Penn-Central Railroad commuter line, and
is adjacent to the railroad's Wallingford Station. The tract was
zoned R-1 Residential, which permits single-family homes on mini-
mum lots of 20,000 square feet.2 The purchase price was to be
$120,000 if the zoning remained unchanged and $140,000 if the tract
were rezoned to permit apartments.
Nether Providence, a township of the first class, contains
13,000 persons in an area of 4.64 square miles. It is located 12 miles
from downtown Philadelphia and is bordered by Swarthmore
on the east, Chester on the south, and Media on the northwest.
Although the predominant land use is single-family homes, the
township also contains scattered shopping areas, some industrial
and manufacturing uses, and two apartment developments totalling
54 units.3 The zoning code had provided for "multiple dwelling"
pellant is hereinafter referred to as "Girsh," and the appellees, including
Nether Providence and the intervenors, are hereinafter referred to as the
"Township."
2. NETHER PROVIDENCE, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE art. III (1963).
3. One group of apartments is a small garden apartment develop-
ment built by the federal government as defense housing during World
War II. It was built without the necessity of conforming to local codes.
A 1959 amendment to the Nether Providence Zoning Ordinance constituted
these apartments a special district to prevent the "unconscionable economic
waste" of demolishing or relocating the non-conforming structures. Nether
Providence, Pa., Ordinance 351, May 21, 1959; NETHER PROVIDENCE, PA.,
ZONING ORDINANCE art. V-b (1963). The other apartments are duplexes
as a permitted use, but this provision was deleted by amendment
in 1952.
The topography of the Duer Tract is rought and rocky, with a
fifty foot drop in elevation, steep grades, two streams, and a two
or three acre swampy area. After deciding that it was economically
infeasible to build single-family homes in accordance with the
existing zoning,4 Girsh applied for building permits for two nine-
story luxury apartment buildings, each having 280 dwelling units.
Girsh later agreed to reduce the number of units to 216 per build-
ing. The plan called for first floor shops, parking for 1,000 auto-
mobiles, 500 of which would be underground, and a total land
coverage of 40%.
In February 1967, the building inspector refused to issue the
permits because the Nether Providence zoning ordinance contained
no provision for apartment uses. Girsh appealed to the zoning
board of adjustment which held hearings and affirmed the build-
ing inspector's decision.
In July 1967, Girsh filed an appeal in the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas. Nether Providence Township, various
civic associations, and several private citizens intervened. Judge
E.E. Lippincott II held hearings in September and November of
1967. The bulk of the testimony concerned (1) the effect of an
apartment development on municipal roads and services, and (2)
whether the topography of the tract prevented profitable single-
family home development. Judge Lippincott's decision, rendered
in September 1968, upheld the zoning board. 5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed the appeal under
Rule 68 on October 30, 1968. Argument was held in May 1969,
and the decision 7 was rendered on February 13, 1970.
B. The Decision
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the court of com-
mon pleas, holding unconstitutional the Nether Providence zoning
code's failure to provide for apartments. The majority opinion was
written by Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Eagen and O'Brien.
Chief Justice Bell concurred" with the majority. Justices Cohen
and Pomeroy joined in a dissenting opinion 9 written by Justice
which were constructed under a variance. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-4,
In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Brief for
Appellees at 17, In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970).
4. This fact was disputed by appellees, who claimed that Girsh at
no time intended to construct single-family homes. Brief for Appellees at
2-5, In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
5. Girsh Zoning Case, 56 Del. Co. Rep. 132 (C.P. Pa. 1968).
6. PA. Sup. CT. R. 68 .
7. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
8. Id. at 246, 263 A.2d at 399 (concurring opinion).
9. Id. at 248, 263 A.2d at 400 (dissenting opinion).
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Jones.
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Roberts' majority opinion begins with the general
proposition that an individual should be able to utilize his land as
he sees fit, subject only to reasonable police power regulations
such as zoning. The rest of the opinion deals with the extent of
the reasonable exercise of this power.
As a preliminary matter, Justice Roberts rejected the Town-
ship's contention that, rather than prohibiting apartments, the
zoning code merely failed to provide for them and that apart-
ments were, therefore, a permitted use available by securing a
variance. 10 Justice Roberts held that failure to provide for apart-
ments, except on the narrow grounds justifying a variance, was
legally tantamount to a prohibition.
The crux of the decision is that no township can zone to
avoid bearing its share of the natural population expansion pro-
duced by urban out-migration. The decision is based on the follow-
ing rationale. Suburban homeowners left the city to escape urban
congestion and to enjoy the freedom, open space, leisure life, and
growing job opportunities of the suburbs. Although first in time,
existing residents are not first in right; they cannot exclude others
who seek the same advantages. Since Nether Providence is a logi-
cal area for population growth, an attempt to exclude that growth
by prohibiting apartments is an unconstitutional exercise of the
police power.
Justice Roberts rejected the Township's argument that the
prohibition was reasonably necessary to prevent overburdening of
municipal services and facilities, particularly roads." Without
analyzing the Township's specific contentions, Justice Roberts
held that municipal service problems can be controlled by reason-
able regulation of apartment location, set-back, height, and other
factors. According to Justice Roberts, the Township must plan in
advance to service expected growth and not use zoning to prevent
burdens on its services and facilities.
Nether Providence argued that apartments would clash with
the existing single-family residential form of development. The
majority held that factors such as aesthetics and the character of
the community are insufficient to justify exclusionary zoning.
Justice Roberts concluded by allaying fears that the decision
10. Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396.
11. Id. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.
requires municipalities to provide for all types of land uses. This
is not a logical result of Girsh because the decision is restricted to
residential expansion, what Justice Roberts calls "the right of
people to live on land.'
u2
2. The Concurring Opinion
Consistent with past opinions,'3 Chief Justice Bell emphasized
the importance of private property rights unencumbered except by
closely restricted police power regulations. Zoning and nuisance
standards, according to Chief Justice Bell, should not be so broadly
construed as to deny rights in private property. Chief Justice
Bell reasoned that, while apartments can be regulated, they can-
not be totally prohibited without violating private property rights.
Althought the Chief Justice said that "whether an ordinance which
makes no provision for, or authorization of, apartment houses is
equivalent to a total prohibition thereof raises (at least, for me) a
difficult question,"1 4 he found the instant ordinance to be a pro-
hibition in practical effect.
3. The Dissent
Justice Jones, in his dissent, refused to equate the failure to
provide for a use with a total prohibition. He considered the
ordinance to be constitutionally valid since a developer could seek
a variance to construct apartments.
The dissent argued that the mere lack of a provision in a zon-
ing ordinance for a particular land use does not make the ordinance
unconstitutional per se. Rather, the restriction must be gauged by
traditional police power standards. To hold otherwise would re-
quire municipalities to provide for all types of high-density resi-
dential land uses. The dissent considered it improper for the
court to act as "a super board of adjustment" or "planning com-
mission of last resort"'15 by forcing municipalities to accept inap-
propriate uses.
Even if the ordinance had contained a total prohibition, Jus-
tice Jones would have affirmed the lower court's holding that
Girsh failed to establish that apartments are a suitable land use
in Nether Providence. The dissent considered apartments to be
unsuitable because not in harmony with the sparsely populated
residential character of the community and because the population
12. Id. at 245, 263 A.2d at 399.
13. E.g., Key Realty Co. Zoning Case, 408 Pa. 98, 102, 104-05, 182 A.2d
187, 190, 190-91 (1962) (concurring opinion); Colligan Zoning Case, 401
Pa. 125, 131, 162 A.2d 652, 654 (1960); Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 221,
104 A.2d 118, 120 (1954); Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121, 125-26, 81 A.2d 533,
535 (1951).
14. 437 Pa. at 247, 263 A.2d at 400 (concurring opinion).
15. Id. at 251, 263 A.2d at 402 (dissenting opinion).
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increase would tax municipal services. Since the evidence sup-
ported these two findings, the dissent held that the exclusion bore
a constitutionally reasonable relationship to public health, safety,
morals and general welfare.
The majority decision did not reach Girsh's final argument
that, since it is economically infeasible to build single-family houses,
the ordinance was arbitrary and discriminatory as applied to the
Duer Tract and, therefore, constituted a taking of property. The
dissent, however, considered the large amount of conflicting evi-
dence on this point and decided that sufficient evidence existed
to support the lower court finding that houses could profitably be
constructed on the site.
II. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Suburban Ethic
This analysis will begin with a brief examination of the social
considerations pertinent to the location of apartment houses in
the suburbs.1 6 To a large extent, this was the real issue before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Girsh. The residents who spoke
against Girsh's proposal at the zoning board hearing and who
intervened in the lower court did so not out of a concern for the
legal doctrine involved, but primarily to protect their community
from the intrusion of what they considered to be a socially and
economically undesirable use.' 7 It was to this attitude that the
Township government was responding when it failed to provide
for apartments in the zoning code.
Inner-city high-density living is symptomatic of much that is
undesirable in urban life. Many people associate the economic,
16. See generally AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, APART-
MENTS IN THE SUBURBS (1964); AMERICAN SocIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS,
PLANNING FOR APARTMENTS (1960); NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROB-
LEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 215 (1968); M. NEUTZ, THE USE OF
URBAN LAND AND THE SUBURBAN APARTMENT BOOM (1966); RAYMOND & MAY
Assoc., ZONING CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUBURBS: THREE CASE STUDIES 26-47
(Research Report No. 11, National Comm'n on Urban Problems, 1968)
[hereinafter cited as RAYMOND & MAY Assoc.]; L. SYRACUSE, ARGUMENTS
FOR APARTMENT ZONING (N.A.H.B. Information Bulletin No. 1, 1968); Bab-
cock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA.
L. REV. 1040 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Babcock & Bosselman]; Melamed,
High Rise Apartments in the Suburbs, 20 URBAN LAND 1 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Melamed].
17. To the suburbanite, apartments frequently represent poor or black
neighbors. Several market studies of middle and moderate income black
households, however, found a preference for single-family homes in the
suburbs rather than apartments. THE POTOMAC INSTITUTE, INC., HOUSING
GUIDE TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 20 (1968).
cultural, social and physical deprivation of the slum with high-
density, noisy, dirty tenement houses. What those making this
comparison fail to realize, however, is that the only similarity
between inner-city tenements and luxury suburban apartment
houses is that both house more than one family.
In many cases, inner-city tenements were not constructed as
middle income apartment houses, but were built to house poor im-
migrant labor. Most of them were built before housing and build-
ing codes existed. They were never designed to be beautiful, to
have clean and spacious living quarters, or to have adequate sani-
tary and kitchen facilities. As the urban population grew and
changed in character, the amount of overcrowding and deteriora-
tion increased. To house the increased population, that brand of
landlord known as the slumlord did convert and overcrowd some
once-fashionable buildings, but more frequently he merely main-
tained the generally substandard condition of existing tenements.
Even in the suburbs it is possible for the combined pressures
of rent control, rising taxes, operating and maintenance costs,
absentee ownership, deliberate blockbusting by realtors, and local
apathy to reduce a luxury high-rise to a tenement.' 8 However,
there is little danger of this pattern becoming commonplace in
the suburbs. High land, financing, and construction costs produce
high rentals which insure that new residents are economically
homogeneous with existing residents. Strict building, housing and
land use controls prevent the erection of tenement-like buildings
or the conversion of luxury buildings to tenements. While physi-
cal deterioration and code violations are not visible in a large city,
they are readily detectible in the suburbs, and correction and
compliance are more easily obtained. The surrounding homeown-
ers are more vigilant and vociferous in protecting their environ-
ment than are neighboring tenement owners in the city.
It is dangerous to attempt to analyze the suburban mentality; 19
however, one can discern what might be called the suburb's snob
appeal in the frequent restrictions against multi-family and small
lot single-family zoning, and in the stated zoning rationales of
preserving the community's character or its historic or rural iden-
tity.20 Suburbanites may feel that they have struggled to be able
to escape the city and obtain the advantages of suburban life,
and they may wish to preserve that life style against urban en-
croachment. Single-family suburban homeownership is a whole-
some way of life compared to the densely populated city. The
dislike or fear of apartment houses may thus be based on the
18. RAYMOND & MAY Assoc., supra note 16.
19. An excellent attempt is made by Babcock & Bosselman, supra
note 16, at 1061-72. See also Note, The Battle for Apartments in Benign
Suburbia, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 345-49 (1964).
20. RAYMOND & MAY Assoc., supra note 16, at 27, 34; Babcock & Bos-
selman, supra note 16, at 1046, 1072.
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"ideological" ground that the suburbanite left the city to avoid the
ills which apartment houses represent. In addition, many people
consider the purchase of a home as an investment: they expect
the property value to appreciate over time. The intrusion of a
discordant use is felt to involve economic as well as social harm.
These arguments may not be unreasonable. No one would
argue that the $40,000 house sited on one acre must accept a ten
story, one family per room tenement next door. It is, however,
a different proposition to say that a municipality containing large-
lot expensive houses is justified in rejecting all other residential
uses which have higher densities. Such housing, if well serviced,
designed, and landscaped,21 need not offend the "character of the
community" or depreciate property values.
Building type and lot size are, however, the easy issues. The
more difficult question involves the type of people who will live
in smaller, less expensive homes or in apartments.2 2 The empha-
sis Americans place on homeownership" renders renters second-
class citizens. Since renters do not make the financial commitment
that owners do, it is thought that they will be transient and lack a
serious interest in the community. The question remains, however,
whether suburban residents have the right to restrict entry to
persons of the same socio-economic class as themselves. Justice
Roberts' rationale that suburbs cannot zone to exclude population
expansion does not answer this question.
The issue may, however, be a false one. Due to market factors,
the "type" of people suburbanites fear will normally not be able
21. These considerations go to the essence of Justice Roberts' com-
ment that a municipality can "protect its attractive character by requiring
apartments to be built in accordance with (reasonable) set-back, open
space, height, and other light-and-air requirements. . . ." In re Appeal of
Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970).
Girsh's proposed buildings covered only 2.7 acres of the 17.7 acre tract
(40% of the tract when parking areas are included), were located far back
from the road and adjacent homes, and were screened by existing high
trees.
22. At a zoning hearing in a New York suburb, apartments were ob-
jected to for both structural reasons (height, density, noise, overcrowding
of municipal facilities, lack of parking, road congestion, and inharmonious
character) and on racial grounds. One opponent accused the developer of
"letting the nigger out of the woodpile." Police were necessary to avert a
fistfight. RAYMOND & MAY Assoc., supra note 16, at 34.
23. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 16, at 1046 n.50. This attitude
has been an historical trend. See generally PaESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON
HOME BUILDING AND HOME OWNERSHIP, HOUSING OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
1-5, 161-62 (1932); PREsIDENT's CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HOME
OWNERSHIP, HOME OWNERSHIP, INCOME AND TYPES OF DWELLINGS, 1-6, 29-30
(1932).
to afford suburban home prices or apartment rentals. Girsh's
proposal, for example, was for a high-rise "luxury" apartment.
It is therefore probable that the occupants of Girsh's proposed
structure would be socio-economically compatible with existing
residents. Many suburban apartment dwellers are older persons.
They previously lived in single-family homes in the community,
but when their children matured and moved away, they found
the home too large for their needs and too difficult to maintain.
Desiring to remain in the same community, these older persons
seek apartment accommodations. Another large group of poten-
tial residents is young, newly married couples who want the
benefits of suburban life without being able to afford a home. As
their income rises and they have children, they can be expected to
seek a house in the same or an adjacent community. Both these
groups of residents can hardly be labelled transient or uninterested
in the community.
24
Suburbanites are, therefore, probably not justified in expect-
an influx of low-income or black residents. If federal housing
subsidy programs move beyond reliance on local initiative to a
strategy of direct federal intervention, suburbanites may have
more to fear than they do from the present efforts of private de-
velopers who build within market constraints.
The interrelationship between type of building and type of
occupant is a complex one. Some authors observe that most of the
anti-apartment arguments relate to the occupant and not to the
building type.2 5 However, as Girsh's brief points out,26 the same
arguments logically apply, but are seldom made, against individuals
who seek to rent a single-family home. Similarly, suburban resi-
dents would be expected to resist a high-rise condominium even
though the occupant owns his unit. Since modern condominia
are extremely expensive, condominium owners are economically
comparable to existing residents and are probably less transient
than renters of single-family homes. The explanation for these dif-
ferent observations may be that suburbanites fear encroachment
by unaesthetic building types, undesirable residents or any use
which might harm their social or economic investment.
B. General Welfare Analysis and the Population Exclusion Ra-
tionale
Pennsylvania law begins with the general prescription that
zoning classifications are constitutionally valid whenever they
bear a reasonable relation to public health, safety, morals and
24. Brief for Appellant at 19, In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970); Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 16, 1057-58; Melamed,
supra note 16, at 3.
25. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 16, at 1062-72.
26. Brief for Appellant at 50, In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970).
Apartments in the Suburbs
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
general welfare.27 Health and safety were the primary standards
in the early cases; 28 general welfare became the major criterion in
1958.29 The relationship between the general welfare analysis and
zoning codes which prohibit or severely restrict various uses has
experienced a checkered career. In cases involving exclusionary
zoning, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court customarily analyzes the
reasonableness of the relationship of the zoning to the general
welfare,80 and has adopted the rationale that a total prohibition
must bear a more substantial relationship to the general welfare
than an ordinance which merely segregates uses into distinct dis-
tricts.3 ' The Girsh case breaks with this tradition by holding
that zoning adopted with an exclusionary intent is unconstitu-
tional3 2 without examination of the relationship to the general
welfare.
1. From Bilbar to Kit-Mar
In several early cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied
on the general welfare analysis to uphold residential restrictions
such as one acre minimum lot size zoning,3 3 prohibition of row
houses,34 and 20,000 square foot minimum lot size zoning.3 5 In a
27. E.g., Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 425 Pa. 43,
228 A.2d 169 (1967); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of
Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 393 Pa.
106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958); Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951);
White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
The health, safety, morals, or general welfare standard will be gen-
erically referred to throughout this Article as the "general welfare analy-
sis."
28. E.g., Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951); White's Ap-
peal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
29. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958); Bilbar
Const. Co. v. Board of Adj., 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). For an excellent
discussion of the development of zoning standards in Pennsylvania, see Key
Realty Co. Zoning Case, 408 Pa. 98, 102, 111-19, 182 A.2d 187, 190, 194-98
(1962) (concurring opinion). See also Note, Snob Zoning: Developments
in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARV. J. LEOiS. 246, 252-56 (1970).
30. In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Pa. I A.2d
(1970); Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169
(1967); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d
587 (1957); cf. Rolling Green Golf Club Case, 374 Pa. 450, 97 A.2d 523
(1953).
31. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 425 Pa. 43, 59-60, 228
A.2d 169, 179 (1967).
32. This reasoning will be referred to as the "population exclusion
rationale."
33. Bilbar Const. Co. v. Board of Adj., 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
34. Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952). See also Swade
v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958).
35. In re Volpe's Appeal, 384Pa. 374, 121 A.2d 97 (1956).
case involving a non-residential use, 6 the court went so far as to
say:
That brings us to appellants' contention that the zoning
ordinance is invalid because it makes no provision for in-
dustrial use of property within the Township. But, that
circumstance does not, ipso facto, constitute a legal de-
fect. . . . The exclusion of industrial use involves an exer-
cise of legislative discretion under the existing facts and
circumstances.8 7
The first important case holding an exclusion to be uncon-
stitutional was Archbishop O'Hara's Appeals" which involved a
zoning code excluding a parochial school. General welfare con-
siderations dominated the opinion. The township sought to uphold
the restriction on the ground that a school would change the resi-
dential character of the neighborhood, depreciate real estate val-
ues, and increase traffic necessitating the widening of streets and
the installation of sidewalks and streetlights. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decided that the first two objections were irrelevant
to the proper exercise of the zoning power, and held that the
traffic issue did not bear a sufficient relation to general welfare
to support the exclusion. Although the court relied on the general
welfare analysis, its reasoning foreshadowed the Girsh opinion:
Any traffic increase with its attendant noise, danger and
hazards is unpleasant, yet, such increase is one of the
"inevitable accompaniments of suburban progress, and of
our constantly expanding population" which, standing
alone, does not constitute a sufficient reason to refuse a
property owner the legitimate use of his land. .... 9
Since any use of the site would require some public improvements,
municipal expense in widening the streets and providing sidewalks
and lighting was held to bear an insufficient relation to general
welfare.
An early case involving a residential restriction was Schmalz
v. Buckingham Township Zoning Board of Adjustment40 in which a
fifty foot building set-back requirement in an agricultural district
36. Mutual Supply Co. Appeal, 366 Pa. 424, 77 A.2d 612 (1951).
37. Id. at 430, 77 A.2d at 615. See also Peterson v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.,
412 Pa. 582, 195 A.2d 523 (1963); Mignatti Appeal, 403 Pa. 144, 168 A.2d
567 (1961); Catholic Cemeteries Ass'n Zoning Case, 379 Pa. 516, 190 A.2d
537 (1954).
38. 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957).
39. Id. at 54, 131 A.2d at 596 (emphasis in original), quoting from
Rolling Green Golf Club Case, 374 Pa. 450, 456, 97 A.2d 523, 526 (1953). In
Rolling Green, a golf course had been prevented from constructing a drive-
way through property it had purchased in a residential district. The court
held that the club had a lawful right to construct the driveway on its
own land unless it would be detrimental to the residential neighborhood.
Although nearby residents objected to increased traffic, noise, dirt and haz-
ards, the court held that "these unpleasant burdens are some of the in-
evitable accompaniments of suburban progress and of our constantly ex-
panding population." 374 Pa. at 456, 97 A.2d at 526.
40. 389 Pa. 295, 132 A.2d 233 (1957).
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was held to be unreasonable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
discussed police power justifications such as traffic congestion,
fire, panic, health, light and air, overcrowding of land, population
concentration, conservation of property values, and provision of
transportation, sewage, water, and other public services. The court
concluded that since the set-back bore no reasonable relationship
to the public good, it was an improper exercise of the police power.
In EIler v. Board of Adjustment,41 a similar although non-
residential case, the court held the set-back regulations imposed
on mushroom houses were so great that the mushroom business
would be economically infeasible. The court noted that prevention
of odors and sanitation problems were the general welfare under-
pinnings of the regulation. Significantly, the court did not discuss
the general welfare justifications, but held the regulation to be
unreasonable because tantamount to a blanket prohibition.
One year later in Norate Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjust-
ment,42 the court extended the Eller doctrine that a total prohibi-
tion is too broad and, therefore, patently unreasonable. The
zoning provision in Norate prohibited all off-site advertising signs.
Although the court used general welfare language, it again did so
without analysis and with no real bearing on the actual holding
that the total prohibition was patently unreasonable. Norate was
followed the next year in In re Appeal of Ammon R. Smith Auto
Co.,43 a case involving a prohibition of flashing and intermittent
lights on signs. The township claimed that the ordinance pro-
tected motorists who might be distracted by flashing signs. In
holding the prohibition patently unjustifiable, the court did not
analyze this contention.
In National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township
Board of Adjustment,44 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
came to grips with a zoning classification (four acre minimum resi-
dential lot size) which had the direct effect of restricting popula-
tion growth. The township relied on four general welfare argu-
ments to support the restriction: (1) proper sewage disposal, (2)
protection of water from pollution, (3) inadequacy of the road
system and the difficulty of providing fire protection over narrow
and congested roads, and (4) preservation of the character of the
township-open space, rural atmosphere, historic sites, and settings
of older homes. All four arguments were discussed at length. The
41. 414 Pa. 1, 198 A.2d 863 (1964).
42. 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965).
43. 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966).
44. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
court decided the testimony on points one and two was not con-
vincing, since most homes in the township, even on smaller lots,
had on-site sewage and the water supply was assured by the
Philadelphia Suburban Water Company. On point three, the court
examined the township's road capacity and found it adequate.
Point four was held to be irrelevant as a zoning consideration.
Although National Land analyzed and found lacking the nec-
essary general welfare relationship, the crux of the holding was
that a township cannot use zoning to shirk responsibilities imposed
by population growth. The court noted that Easttown was in the
path of natural population expansion from Philadelphia on the
east and from the King of Prussia-Valley Forge area on the north.
The court said:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which
enables them to more effectively meet the demands of
evolving and growing communities. It must not and can-
not be used by those officials as an instrument by which
they may shirk their responsibilities. Zoning is a means
by which a governmental body can plan for the future-it
may not be used as a means to deny the future .... Zon-
ing provisions may not be used . . . to avoid the increased
responsibilities and economic burdens which time and
natural growth invariably bring.4 5
Although National Land analyzed health, safety, morals, and gen-
eral welfare issues, its primary holding was that zoning is in-
valid if its principle purpose is to impede the entrance of new-
comers so that the township can avoid future burdens.
In Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,46 the
court held a zoning code to be unconstitutional to the extent that
it excluded quarrying. Although it held that the prohibition must
be examined with "particular circumspection," it discussed the
general welfare considerations at length, and did not declare the
exclusion unconstitutonal per se on the authority of Eller, Norate,
and Smith. The Exton court analyzed six general welfare aspects
which the township claimed justified the restriction: (1) excessive
truck traffic, (2) disturbance of underground water supply, (3)
danger to children, (4) air pollution from dust, (5) noise and vibra-
tion from blasting, and (6) aesthetics. After examining the testi-
mony, the court decided against the municipality on each point.
Since the restriction bore no reasonable relation to general wel-
fare, it was held to be an unjustifiable prohibition of a "legitimate
business."
Finally, eleven days after the Girsh holding, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decided In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders.47 The
45. Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.
46. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
47. Pa. , A.2d (1970). Kit-Mar is factually similar
to the National Land decision, and was based squarely on it. For that rea-
son, this Article will discuss Kit-Mar only as it relates to the issues raised
by the Girsh case.
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tract in question was zoned to require two acre minimum lots
along existing roads and three acre minimum lots in the interior.
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, examined the township's
contention that the lot size was necessary for proper sewage dis-
posal, but found the claim to be "patently ridiculous" and a "sheer
fantasy."4 s  The court invalidated the classification, specifically
following National Land and indicating that "a scheme of zoning
that has an exclusionary purpose or result is not acceptable in
Pennsylvania.
'49
2. Girsh and Precedent
It is difficult to rationalize these cases. Eller, Norate, and
Smith held that the prohibition was patently unreasonable without
further examination. National Land seemed to reject the patently
unconstitutional argument by holding that since "every zoning
case involves a different set of facts and circumstances . . . it is
impossible for us to say that any minimum acreage requirement
is unconstitutional. '"50 Similarly, in Kit-Mar, Roberts wrote that
"we do not intend to say, of course, that minimum lot size re-
quirements are inherently unreasonable."5'1 Girsh, however, con-
tains no such language; its failure to discuss the general welfare
implies that it accepted the Eller-Norate-Smith reasoning.
On the other hand, O'Hara, National Land, Exton, and Kit-Mar
examined the parameters of the reasonableness of the relationship
to the general welfare, whereas Eller, Norate, and Smith did not.
National Land and Kit-Mar went beyond the O'Hara-Exton general
welfare analysis to discuss the exclusionary intent and effect of
the restriction. The court in National Land and Kit-Mar could
have invalidated the zoning classification after refuting the gen-
eral welfare points, but instead it went further and held that the
zoning was unconstitutional because it had been adopted with
the intent to exclude population expansion.
National Land and Kit-Mar are the only cases involving re-
strictions on housing. A logical conclusion is that the popula-
tion exclusion argument is the preferred rationale in cases involv-
ing restrictions on residential uses. This is emphasized by Girsh
48. Pa. at , A.2d at . The relationship of sewage
disposal to the proper exercise of the zoning power is explored in Delaware
County Community College Appeal, 435 Pa. 264, 254 A.2d 641 (1969).
49. Pa. at I A.2d at
50. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa.
504, 523, 215 A.2d 597, 607-08 (1965).
51. In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Pa. , , A.2d
, (1970).
when it specifically distinguishes "the right of people to live on
land, '5 2 from industry, billboards or quarries.
Although there is a functional relationship between popula-
tion expansion and business expansion, the population exclusion
rationale has appeared only in cases involving residential restric-
tions. Housing is the raison d'etre of suburban areas. While
general welfare arguments may support an intended business or
industrial restriction, 3 municipalities apparently cannot adopt an
ordinance intended to avoid population expansion, regardless of
the general welfare considerations. To do so is a denial of the
suburb's basic function.
The O'Hara decision supports this hypothesis. Business and
employment opportunities are not necessary to service population
growth. The mobility of the suburbanite allows him to travel by
automobile to work or shop in nearby areas. However, schools are
as immediately necessary to population growth as is housing. A
restriction on schools is thus more of a tool to avoid population
growth than is a restriction on business or industry.14 O'Hara,
therefore, has closer logical affinity to National Land, Kit-Mar and
Girsh than to the business-industry cases. This relationship is re-
flected in O'Hara's rationale that traffic increase is a necessary con-
comitant of population expansion.5 5 Thus the only other case in-
volving a use functionally related to population expansion con-
tains language analogous to the population exclusion rationale.
If the cases are analyzed in the above manner, Girsh is con-
sistent with precedent, although it does represent an extension.
Girsh involved housing and was decided on the O'Hara-National
Land-Kit-Mar rationale that a municipality cannot zone to avoid
population expansion rather than on the rationale of Exton, Eller,
Norate, and Smith. In fact, the court distinguished these latter
cases by saying that Girsh deals with "the crucial problem of popu-
lation, not with billboards or quarries." 6
The departure from precedent in Girsh involved the lack of a
general welfare analysis. Although National Land and Kit-Mar
were based on the population exclusion rationale, they nevertheless
analyzed the municipalities' contentions that the exclusion was
reasonably related to health, safety, morals, and general welfare.
52. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 399
(1970) (emphasis in original).
53. Under the doctrine of Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.,
425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967), that a township cannot exclude a "legiti-
mate business," municipalities will be hard pressed to justify such exclu-
sions. See discussion at notes 117-21 and accompanying text infra.
54. It is notable that the applicant in another recent case involving
restrictive zoning was an educational institution. Delaware County Com-
munity College Appeal, 435 Pa. 264, 254 A.2d 641 (1969).
55. Note 39 and accompanying text supra.
56. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 243, 263 A.2d 395, 398
(1970).
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While Girsh adopted the population exclusion rationale, it did not
analyze the general welfare issues. In so doing, the Girsh court
relied on Exton's holding that prohibitory ordinances must be
regarded with "particular circumspection." However, the Exton
court interpreted this to mean that such provisions must bear a
more substantial relationship to health, safety, morals, and general
welfare than a code which merely segregates uses by locationN
In Exton, extended examination of the general welfare contentions
led to the conclusion that the requisite relationship was not met.
The court in Girsh neither required the relationship to be more
substantial nor examined the general welfare issues. In following
the population exclusion rationale alone, the court in Girsh vio-
lated the traditional practice of examining general welfare issues.
While the failure of Girsh to examine general welfare con-
siderations produced the same result as Eller, Norate and Smith,
Girsh did not adopt the rationale utilized by those cases that
total prohibitions are patently unconstitutional. The reliance by
the dissenters in Girsh on Lofmer, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment
of Easttown Township5" is therefore misplaced. Contrary to El-
ler, Norate and Smith, the Lofmer decision held that failure of a
code to provide for a given use does not make the ordinance ipso
facto unconstitutional. The Girsh court, however, did not hold that
the ordinance was ipso facto unconstitutional because it failed to
provide for apartments, but rather that it was unconstitutional
because it had been adopted with an exclusionary intent.
3. General Welfare v. Population Exclusion
By emphasizing the population exclusion rationale over the
general welfare analysis, the majority in Girsh avoided the neces-
sity of making an extended examination of the relationship of
the exclusion to health, safety, morals or general welfare. In so
doing, the court may have abandoned the balancing of burden and
benefit in favor of a possibly uncritical response to present-day
necessity. Both appellee's and appellant's briefs contained con-
siderable discussion of the reasonableness of the restriction vis-a-
vis general welfare.5 9 Rather than analyze this issue, the court
57. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 425 Pa. 43, 59-60, 228
A.2d 169, 179 (1967). The genesis of this doctrine can be found in Arch-
bishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957). The court said that
traffic increase, standing alone, did not validate the exclusion of a paro-
chial school, implying that it required a higher safety and general welfare
standard. Note 39 and accompanying text supra.
58. 11 Ches. Co. Rep. 66 (C.P. Pa. 1963).
59. Brief for Appellees at 12-13, 34-40, In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh,
responded to the current impetus to leave the congested urban
core. This approach vests a right in potential suburbanites who
cannot afford or do not desire single-family homes without con-
sidering the corresponding burdens on the community.
Justice Roberts relied upon the future effectiveness of regional
planning and zoning to distribute public benefits and burdens
more equitably.60 Until that time, however, the court should not
disregard the effects of its decisions on municipalities. It is a very
real possibility that the impact of apartments on a municipality
might be so severe that the only reasonable regulation is prohibi-
tion. Under Girsh such zoning would be unconstitutional even if
a proper balancing of private rights and general welfare would
support it.
Girsh and Kit-Mar held that any zoning classification adopted
for the purpose or with the result of impeding future growth is
unconstitutional. If this be true, then any code provision or
municipal regulation adopted for that purpose would be uncon-
stitutional, whether or not prohibitory. For instance, in National
Land and Kit-Mar, limitations which were not prohibitions were
invalidated. In Girsh, however, Justice Roberts reserved for mu-
nicipalities the right to regulate or restrict uses, so long as such
regulation or restrictions are reasonable. 61 If a municipality uses
this right in an unreasonable manner to restrict a use to a very
small or a topographically unusable site, such regulation should
be unconstitutional as a total prohibition because adopted with the
intent or result of excluding population. For a court to mediate
the bounds of what is reasonable in such a situation involves draw-
ing extremely fine lines and requires inquiry into the motives of
public officials. Since Kit-Mar invalidates a provision when the
intent or result is exclusionary, the court must decide, ex post
facto, that a zoning provision is unconstitutional because it has the
effect of stunting population growth, even though that was not
the intent when the provision was first adopted. The relationship
between the purpose and the effect of a public action is a complex
one requiring a type of examination which may be unsuited for the
judiciary.
62
It should not be the judiciary's function to supervise the sys-
tem to the extent of prescribing the location and lot size of various
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Brief for Appellant at 13-15, 20-23, 37-51,
In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
60. See note 107 and accompanying text infra.
61. See notes 122-26 and accompanying text infra.
62. "Under the facts of this case we do not believe that the ques-
tion of motivation for the referendum (apart from a consideration of its
effect) is an appropriate one for judicial inquiry." Southern Alameda
Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, F.2d (9th Cir.
1970) (see text accompanying note 100 infra). The court felt inquiry into
the voters' motives would involve an "intolerable invasion of the privacy
that must protect an exercise of the franchise." Id. at
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uses. The court cannot function properly in such a supervisory
role since it must rely on private litigants to bring disputes into
court. This type of incremental decision-making is the antithesis
of zoning and planning's emphasis on comprehensive rationality.
In departing from the general welfare analysis, the court is
not protecting municipal rights to limit its own development, 63
nor the landowner's right to use his property as he sees fit.
Rather, the court is protecting the right of those "nameless thou-
sands of potential suburban apartment dwellers"6 4 who either
cannot afford or do not desire to live in a single-family home.
The real party in interest in the Girsh case is the future suburban
apartment resident. Justice Roberts recognized that "people are
attempting to move away from the urban core areas, relieving the
grossly over-crowded conditions that exist in most of our major
cities"65 and that "most jobs that are being created in urban
areas ...are in the suburbs."6 6 The court is thus looking beyond
the interests of the particular tract of ground or the particular
municipality. It is looking at the larger issue of the relationship
of suburban restrictions to urban problems and has adopted a
policy of requiring suburban municipalities to plan for and to
service that part of the population explosion which desires to
live within its borders.67
That the court is considering this larger picture is under-
scored by the fact that in both Girsh and Kit-Mar Justice Roberts
expressed the hope that regional planning and zoning might some-
day settle, without the necessity for judicial intervention, ques-
tions of allocating population growth and the land uses necessary
to accommodate that growth. The encouragement of regional zon-
ing may be the prime justification for abandoning the general wel-
fare rationale in favor of larger considerations. 8
63. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10604 (Supp. 1970).
64. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 16, at 1059.
65. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 263 A.2d 395, 398
(1970).
66. Id.
67. In the absence of a clear indicator, the court will depend on the
market to tell it when a municipality's time has come:
The simple fact that someone is anxious to build apartments is
strong indication that the location of this township is such that
people are desirous of moving in, and we do not believe Nether
Providence can close its doors to those people.
In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970).
While the court may rely on the market to indicate when a townsiup
must accept additional population, the question of how much population
growth must be left initially within municipal discretion.
68. Discussed at notes 106-16 and accompanying text infra.
C. The Question of Remedies
To state that municipalities cannot zone to exclude population
growth raises the question of remedies. In both Girsh and Kit-
Mar the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the zoning code to be
unconstitutional. For the court to do more, that is, to specify the
location of apartment buildings, the number of units they should
contain, the proper lot size, or the building height, set-back and
other regulations, would cast the court as a "super board of ad-
justment" or a "planning commission of last resort."'6 9 Justice
Roberts set the boundaries of judicial intervention by defining
the court as "a judicial overseer, drawing the limits beyond which
local regulation may not go, but loathing to interfere, within those
limits, with the discretion of local governing bodies."70 Declaring
the code unconstitutional was thus the only proper relief the
court could have granted.
Several federal courts, when faced with questions of due proc-
ess and equal protection in housing cases, have granted much
broader and more specific relief. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency,71 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals sug-
gested that the redevelopment agency was required to take affirma-
tive action to assure nonwhite displacees of adequate relocation
housing. A mandatory injunction, ordering the city to issue build-
ing permits for multi-family low-income housing, was granted in
Dailey v. City of Lawton.72 A federal district court in Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority7" went even further. The order
divided Cook County into a racially-impacted area and a non-
ghetto area. The court prohibited construction of public housing
in the former until the construction of 700 units had been com-
menced in the latter, and thereafter for every one unit constructed
69. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa.
504, 521, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965). The dissent in Girsh felt that the ma-
jority had already gone too far, even without more detailed regulation:
By concluding that the township must provide for high-rise apart-
ments, the majority also impliedly holds that every possible use,
having no greater detrimental effect, must also be allowed. In my
opinion, this decision places us in the position of a "super board
of adjustment" or "planning commission of last resort," a posi-
tion which we have heretofore specifically rejected.
437 Pa. at 251, 263 A.2d at 402 (dissenting opinion).
70. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa.
504, 521, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965). On the propriety of judicial inter-
vention in local zoning decisions, compare Robinson v. City of Bloomfield
Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957), with Vickers v. Township
Comm'n of Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962) (dis-
senting opinion), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
71. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
73. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (Judgment Order entered at 304
F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969)); accord, Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619
(E.D. La. 1969). See also Otey v. Common Council of City of Milwaukee,
281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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in the former the court required that three units be built in the
latter. In addition, the court specified regulations on building
size, height, location, and number of occupants. The decision re-
quired the housing authority to use its best efforts to increase the
supply of public housing units. Recent commentary on the
Gautreaux case labelled the decree "overly ambitious" and an "ex-
cessively large step in the judicial administration of public housing
programs. '7 4 Not only did the decree require affirmative action,
but it specified what action the housing authority had to take.
The remedies in both Girsh and Gautreaux were justified by
their fact situations. Girsh involved a public provision infringing
on a private property right. Invalidation of the provision restored
the proper balance without a further judicial inroad into local dis-
cretion. In Gautreaux, public action had denied equal protection in
a sensitive area of racial confrontation. To right the balance re-
quired more than mere invalidation of the practice; the court had
to reverse the trend by ordering discrimination in favor of blacks. 75
It is arguable that Girsh involved a question of racial discrimina-
tion of no less magnitude than that in Gautreaux, requiring, per-
haps, as pervasive a remedy. 76 On the Girsh fact situation, how-
ever, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not have been justi-
fied in making a broader decree.
The form of remedy utilized in Girsh has a serious defect: it
sends the matter back to the local government for resolution. In
the process of remedying the constitutional flaw, the local deci-
sion-making machinery will again respond to the political pressures
which caused the original ordinance to exclude apartments. This
in fact was the aftermath of Girsh. Shortly after the decision
Nether Providence began consideration of an amendment to the
zoning code which permitted apartment development on four tracts
in the Township, but left the Duer Tract zoned R-1 Residential.
77
74. Note, Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal Protection
and Public Housing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 439, 447 (1970).
75. This concept was popularized in P. FRmnD, ON LAw AND JUSTICE
33-34 (1968).
Not every allegation of racial discrimination will result in active
judicial intervention. See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organiza-
tion v. Union City, F.2d , (9th Cir. 1970) (injunction denied
because it would "not serve to freeze the status quo but would require that
affirmative steps now be taken in the direction of the ultimate remedy
sought by appellants"); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.
1969), rev'g 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
76. This contention is more fully explored in the conclusion. See
notes 91-105 and accompanying text infra.
77. This attempt to impede apartment development on the Duer Tract
Alternatively, a township could so restrict an apartment zone as
to make apartment development infeasible.
On the other hand, the developer can attempt to foreclose
these exclusionary results. Since the decision of the building in-
spector refusing permits for apartments on the Duer Tract was re-
versed, the requested permits should be forthcoming. If Girsh
filed an application for building permits, the inspector could be
legally compelled to issue them if the application met building
code standards, since no zoning approval is necessary. However,
the mere application for a permit conveys no vested rights; it can
be refused as long as permits have not been issued and detrimen-
tally relied upon in good faith.78 Several cases in Pennsylvania
have held that permits need not be issued if the applicant ap-
plied when an amendatory ordinance rezoning the tract was pend-
ing before the municipal legislative body. 79 When an ordinance
can be considered "pending" is a difficult question. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has held the amendment to be pending
after two readings by council,80 when the public hearing has
been scheduled but not held,81 or even on the day it was intro-
duced into council.8 2 In another case, however, an amendment
was held not pending after it was referred by council to the plan-
ning commission, approved by that body and sent back to council,
because no public hearings had been held and the municipality had
never publically announced its intent to rezone.8 3 In addition, if the
permits are not sought in good faith but as an attempt to circum-
vent an expected change, they can be denied.8 4  Therefore, if
Nether Providence Township Commission began consideration of
a new zoning code before an application for building permits were
will probably fail. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reversal of the
court of common pleas has the effect of reversing the decisions of the
Nether Providence Zoning Board and the building inspector refusing to
grant permits to construct apartment buildings. The new developer
(Girsh's transferee) should, therefore, be entitled to the requested per-
mits.
78. Beverly Building Corp. v. Board of Adj. of Lower Merion Twp.,
409 Pa. 417, 187 A.2d 567 (1963); Shender v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 388 Pa. 265,
131 A.2d 90 (1957); A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa.
520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952);
Mutual Supply Co. Appeal, 366 Pa. 424, 77 A.2d 612 (1951); Appeal of A. N.
"Ab" Young Co., 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948).
79. Colligan Zoning Case, 401 Pa. 125, 162 A.2d 652 (1960); Shender v.
Zoning Bd. of Adj., 388 Pa. 265, 131 A.2d 90 (1957); Mutual Supply Co.
Appeal, 366 Pa. 424, 77 A.2d 612 (1951); Appeal of A. N. "Ab" Young Co.,
360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948); and cases cited in notes 80-83 infra.
80. Gold v. Building Comm. of Warren Borough, 334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d
367 (1939).
81. Beverly Building Corp. v. Board of Adj. of Lower Merion Twp.,
409 Pa. 417, 187 A.2d 567 (1963).
82. A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105
A.2d 586 (1954).
83. Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963).
84. Id.
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submitted, or if permits were sought with an improper intent, the
building inspector would be justified in refusing to issue them.
By quickly commencing consideration of a zoning amendment, a
township may foreclose action by the developer.
The difficult question of remedies and the necessity for addi-
tional litigation which is caused thereby is well illustrated in the
series of cases involving minimum lot sizes for singe-family dwell-
ings. In 1956, In re Volpe's Appeal85 held valid a 20,000 square
foot minimum with no indication what larger lot sizes would also
be reasonable. Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township
Board of Adjustment"6 in 1958 held valid a one acre minimum.
Seven years later, in National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown
Township Board of Adjustment, 7 four acre minimum lots were
held excessive; again the court did not specify the limits of reason-
able regulation. Finally, In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders"8 held
two and three acre lots excessive in 1970. The parameters of rea-
sonable lot sizes have been slowly emerging in an ad hoc, case by
case method. A proper view of judicial restraint dictates this ap-
proach, except, perhaps, when a case such as Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority89 requires greater judicial intervention. The
piecemeal approach is, however, costly and wasteful and renders
the law uncertain. For instance, without further litigation it may
be impossible to predict what limitations municipalities can con-
stitutionally impose on apartment developments.
III. CONCLUSION: TiE FUTURE OF SUBURBAN HOUSING
It is a simple matter to state what results will not flow from
the Girsh decision. The Girsh decision will not result in large
numbers of suburban high-rise apartment buildings in Pennsyl-
vania; it will not result in suburban housing opportunities for low-
income families; it may not, in fact, result in apartments being
built in Nether Providence.9 0 Girsh will not produce a revolution
because many suburbs contain sufficient existing apartments to
satisfy their duty, and others have zoning codes which permit
85. 384 Pa. 374, 121 A.2d 97 (1956).
86. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
87. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 44-45 supra).
88. Pa. , A.2d (1970) (discussed at text accompanying notes
47-49 supra).
89. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. i11. 1969) (Judgment Order entered at
304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969)) (discussed at notes 73-74 and accompany-
ing text supra).
90. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
apartments. Suburbs desiring to remain without apartments will
employ other methods to obstruct developers. Girsh is at best an
"all deliberate speed" integration of apartments into the suburbs.
A. Equal Protection and Low-Income Suburban Housing
The apartment-suburb conflict in Girsh is related to the
issues of equal protection and constitutional rights in the field
of low-income housing. An ever-growing polarization exists be-
tween the affluent, white suburbanite and the low-income inner-
city resident of both races. Many ghetto dwellers feel trapped by
their environment and seek leisure life, open space, superior schools,
and other suburban advantages. Many suburbanites feel threat-
ened by this desire and erect legal and economic barriers to in-
migration. These barriers greatly restrict the housing opportuni-
ties of inner-city residents9 ' and increase the polarization between
the suburbanite and the city dweller. The Kerner Commission,
for example, found that elimination of such barriers is essential
to reverse the dangerous consequences of racial and residential
separation.
2
The urban-suburban conflict is exemplified by the apartment
dispute. Low-income urbanites have no realistic hope of purchas-
ing a single-family home in the suburbs. Rising land, construction,
and financing costs have forced prices up to the extent that the
median price for a conventionally built home is now $27,000.93
Without a more extensive federal subsidy, which at present is not
politically feasible, this market is beyond the reach of low-income
purchasers. With apartments, however, it would be possible for
the developer to achieve economies that would lower rentals to
within the means of some inner-city residents.9 4 The suburban
self-protective barriers, therefore, frequently appear in the form
of zoning restrictions on apartment and other multi-family de-
velopments. Recognizing this, the President's Committee on Ur-
ban Housing recommended that housing authorities be authorized
to supersede local zoning codes in constructing low-income hous-
91. Note, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New
Jersey, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 246, 248-52 (1970).
92. NATIONAL ADvisoRY COMIM'N ON CIVL DISORDERS, REPORT 480-82
(1968).
93. PRESIDENT'S SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON NATIONAL
HoUSING GOALS I (April 1, 1970).
94. NATIONAL CovM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERiCAN
CITY 215 (1968).
Although economies can be achieved in apartment construction, the
differential between the construction cost per unit of single-family hous-
ing and the cost per unit of multi-family housing is not great enough to
produce a substantial difference in the monthly cost to the consumer of
the two types of housing. Since apartment rentals are somewhat lower,
they can serve lower income groups than single-family homes, although
without federal subsidy the market will not open to those most in need of
better housing and a new environment.
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ing.95 Massachusetts was one of the first states to respond by
adopting a statute permitting developers of low-income housing
to appeal to a state Housing Appeals Committee which has the
power to reverse local zoning decisions. 96
On the issue of opening the suburbs to inner-city residents,
the Girsh case makes only modest impact. The suit was prose-
cuted by a commercial developer wishing to make the most eco-
nornic use of his property, rather than by inner-city residents seek-
ing escape to the suburbs. The proposal was not for low-income
housing, but for a luxury high-rise. The optimistic point is that,
although the holding was not based on equal protection grounds,
it was based on human rights and not on property rights alone.
The rationale that suburbs cannot exclude those seeking a com-
fortable place to live should prove a helpful precedent to those
organizations 97 which are litigating the constitutionality of subur-
ban restrictive zoning.98 Professor Paul Davidoff, head of the Su-
burban Action Institute, believes that the Girsh doctrine will prove
helpful because it refutes several justifications and techniques
which the suburbs have traditionally employed in defense of ex-
clusionary zoning. 99
That the population exclusion rationale will prove helpful is
shown by the appearance of an analogous argument as dicta in a
recent federal appeals court decision.100 The municipality had re-
zoned a tract to permit low-income housing, only to have the
ordinance almost immediately nullified by a referendum. The
95. PRESIDNT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 143-44
(1968); see Renshaw v. Coldwater Housing Comm'n, 381 Mich. 590, 165
N.W.2d 5 (1969).
96. MASS. GEr. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1970). The
New Jersey legislature began consideration of a similar provision on
May 12, 1969 (Bill S. 803, New Jersey Land Use Planning and Development
Law). These statutes are extensively discussed in Note, Snob Zoning:
Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HAFIV. J. LEGIS. 246
(1970).
97. Notably the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People and the Suburban Action Institute of White Plains, New York.
98. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1970, § A, at 51, col. 1. See also Philadel-
phia Evening Bulletin, March 24, 1970, at 18, col. 4; id., April 3, 1970, at
52, col. 3.
The National Commission on Urban Problems recommended that the
Justice Department research the constitutionality of exclusionary zoning
and participate as amicus curiae in cases challenging such zoning. NA-
TIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 243-
44 (1968).
99. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1970, § A, at 51, col. 1.
100. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City,
F.2d (9th Cir. 1970).
sponsor of the proposed housing project sued the city, requesting
an injunction requiring the city to effectuate the zoning changes.
The federal district court denied a three-judge panel and a pre-
liminary injunction. Although the ninth circuit affirmed, it rec-
ognized that "since 1962, suburban pressures have created an in-
creasing need for multi-family housing in Union City"' 0'11 and said:
Surely, if the environmental benefits of land use plan-
ning are to be enjoyed by a city and the quality of life of
its residents is accordingly to be improved, the poor can-
not be excluded from enjoyment of the benefits. Given
the recognized importance of equal opportunities in hous-
ing, it may well be, as a matter of law, that it is the re-
sponsibility of a city and its planning officials to see that
the city's plan as initiated or as it develops accommodates
the needs of its low-income families, who usually-if not
always-are members of minority groups. It may be, as
matter of fact, that Union City's plan, as it has emerged
from the referendum, fails in this respect. These issues
remain to be resolved.
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Besides the population exclusion rationale, Girsh contributes
a new standard of judicial inquiry. No longer are local planning
and land use decisions sacrosanct except in case of gross impro-
priety. The courts are exhibiting a growing awareness of urban-
suburban tension and a new willingness to examine municipal plan-
ning policies. As Professor George Lefcoe' 0' predicts, municipali-
ties are "not going to be allowed just to let the shape of develop-
ment take a form, then codify it.' 10 4 Justice Roberts' emphasis that
the case requires the township to "provide for apartment living as
part of its plan of development"'1 5 supports this prediction.
B. Regional Zoning and the Municipalities Planning Code
In both Girsh and In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders,0 6 Justice
Roberts suggested that the adoption of regional planning and zon-
ing would allow municipalities to allocate unwanted land uses on
a rational basis. 07  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has dealt
101. Id. at
102. Id. at
103. Of the University of Southern California Law School.
104. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1970, § A, at 51, col. 1.
105. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 242, 263 A.2d 395, 397
(1970) (emphasis in original).
106. Pa. , A.2d (1970).
107. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING
THE AMERICAN CITY 222-24 (1968); Becker, Municipal Boundaries and
Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 1;
Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
515 (1957); Note, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1966); Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal
Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107.
It is probable that decisions under Massachusetts' new Snob Zoning
Law will be based on low-income housing needs on a regional basis. Note,
Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARV.
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with inter-municipal zoning in the past. In National Land & In-
vestment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment,""8 Jus-
tice Roberts pointed out that while zoning in surrounding townships
is frequently a relevant consideration, it is not controlling in de-
ciding zoning cases. 10 9 Presumably, if regional zoning existed and
allocated all apartments to Township A and none to Township B,
Justice Roberts would hold the scheme to be controlling in passing
on the validity of the exclusion in Township B. Such exclusionary
zoning, when an element of a regional scheme, should be held valid
despite Justice Roberts' statement in Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment'" that zoning prohibitions are suspect "de-
spite the possible existence outside the municipality of sites on
which the prohibited activity may be conducted.""'
Justice Roberts is, of course, aware that the Pennsylvania
legislature has sought to move municipalities in the direction of
regional zoning, and perhaps he hopes to quicken the pace along
the road. The Municipalities Planning Code, 1 2 adopted in 1968,
is designed to "accomplish a coordinated development of munici-
palities"" 13 and authorizes joint municipal planning commissions
to further that end. 14 The goal of joint planning is not municipal
general welfare, but the "health, safety, morals and the general
welfare of the various areas in the Commonwealth."'"15 The gen-
eral welfare promoted by the Act is not the parochial interests of
individual municipalities, but rather the betterment of entire re-
gions. Inter-municipal cooperation of the type urged by Justice
Roberts is thus a feature of state law. The Girsh case may be
intended to indirectly advance such cooperation. If each munici-
pality is forced to accept unwanted uses, they may decide to plan
and zone jointly under the Planning Code. Thereby, municipalities
will be able to allocate the burdens rather than each accepting all
of them.
J. L.Gxs. 246, 260-61, 269 (1970); see note 96 and accompanying text supra.
In Kit-Mar, Justice Roberts also suggested that municipalities can
solve their land use allocation problems by authorizing planned unit de-
velopments and other innovative subdivision and land use techniques.
See generally Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d
81 (1968).
108. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
109. Id. at 531, 215 A.2d at 612; accord, Bilbar Const. Co. v. Board of
Adj., 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
110. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
111. Id. at 59, 228 A.2d at 179.
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Supp. 1970).
113. Id. § 10105.
114. Id. § 11102.
115. Id. § 11101.
Whether or not municipalities make use of the Planning Code,
Justice Roberts has served notice that "as long as we allow zoning
to be done community by community, it is intolerable to allow one
municipality (or many municipalities) to close its doors at the
expense of surrounding communities and the central city."116
C. The Bounds of Permissible Exclusionary Zoning
Justice Roberts indicates that since Girsh involves the right
of people to live on land, it does not stand for the proposition
that all municipalities must provide for all types of land uses.
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When Girsh and Exton are read together, however, it is arguable
that a municipality may not exclude what the court considers to be
a "reasonable" use. The Girsh court concluded that while a subur-
ban township may be justified in excluding "certain industrial
uses," such an exclusion would be suspect under Exton."8
When the cases are combined, failure to provide for a use is
unconstitutional when (1) the exclusion is adopted for an uncon-
stitutional purpose, or (2) the use is a reasonable one. As dis-
cussed earlier, 19 the first of these criteria involves the court in diffi-
cult questions of collective motive and intent. To fulfill the second
criteria, the court must determine what constitutes a reasonable
use. In Exton the majority assumed that quarrying was a "legiti-
mate business." In Girsh the dissent found that appartments were
not a reasonable use. The record in Girsh contained much con-
flicting evidence, especially expert testimony and official planning
reports, as to whether apartments were a reasonable use in Nether
Providence. While the majority was willing to ignore this evidence
when the case involved the right to live on land, it is clear under
the Exton decision that the rationale of the reasonableness of
the use will be applied in cases of non-residential uses.1 20
The synthesis does not allow much leeway to local govern-
ments. Residential uses cannot be restricted if the intent or result
is to impede population growth. If such an impedimentary intent
is not present, residential uses are still presumably not prohibit-
able because they are a reasonable and legitimate use in the sub-
urbs. A real problem is presented, as predicted by the appellee's
brief:
There is no way to hold that a municipality must
allow high-rise apartments somewhere in order to have
a valid zoning ordinance without at the same time estab-
lishing a precedent that each municipality must also pro-
116. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 399
(1970).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 246 & n.6, 263 A.2d at 399 & n.6.
119. Page 650 supra.
120. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 425 Pa. 43, 59, 228
A.2d 169, 179 (1967).
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vide somewhere for mid-rise apartments, garden-type
apartments, row homes, town houses, twin houses, duplexes,
single homes on uniform lots and single homes in cluster
development.
121
Residential uses can of course be regulated on health, safety, morals
and general welfare grounds, but present case law does not explore
the parameters of reasonable regulation. For non-residential uses,
the Exton doctrine continues to apply. While a community need
not accept all uses, it has thus become extremely difficult to justify
the exclusion of any particular use, especially if it is residential.
D. The Bounds of Reasonable Regulation
The Girsh case preserves in suburban municipalities the neces-
sary right to reasonably regulate apartment development. The de-
cision explicitly allows municipalities to protect their attractive
character by reasonable use of location, set-back, open space, height,
and other light and air regulations.
122
While there can be no argument with the validity of this
aspect of the decision, in it lies the most fruitful area for future
difficulty. The expected reaction of suburban communities is
for them to walk the tightrope of reasonable regulation, that is,
to pass zoning and other land use restrictions which make it ex-
tremely unattractive to construct apartments, but which are still
within constitutional limits. For instance, the "most common
treatment of multiple family housing is to provide apartment
zones in areas which are not considered desirable for single-family
residences,"' 23 such as zones adjacent to commercial or industrial
uses. Decisions in other jurisdictions have held such regulation to
be reasonable. 124 Not only is there nothing in Girsh to prevent
this response, but the decision specifically allows it:
... [A]ppellee could show that apartments are not appro-
priate on the site where appellant wishes to build, but
that question is not before us as long as the zoning ordi-
nance in question is fatally defective on its face. Appellee
could properly decide that apartments are more appro-
priate in one part of the Township than in another, but it
121. Brief for Appellees at 21, In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
122. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 397
(1970).
123. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 16, at 1060-61. See also RAY-
MOND & MAY Assoc., supra note 16, at 27-29.
124. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 16, at 1060-61 & nn.147-49, 152-53.
cannot decide that apartments can fit in no part of the
Township.
125
Nether Providence is, in fact, considering a zoning amendment
which establishes four apartment zones, but leaves the Duer Tract
zoned R-1 Residential.
1 2
Is restriction of apartment zones to areas considered undesir-
able for single-family housing reasonable? If a township contains
apartments as an existing use, can a litigant claim that it does
not have enough apartments? The answers are unclear. If a
suburban code contains an apartment zone, the fact that no apart-
ments exist in the township may not bring the Girsh doctrine into
play. Lack of apartments may indicate lack of interest on the part
of developers, or it may indicate unreasonable regulation or dis-
criminatory administration of the code. Does Girsh reach the latter
situation? The answer, again, is uncertain. The one thing that is
certain is that Pennsylvania's history of repeated litigation over
minimum lot sizes will be duplicated in the apartment context;
further litigation is required to test suburban regulation and ad-
ministration of the now-required apartment zones.
125. In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 246 n.6, 263 A.2d 395,
399 n.6 (1970) (emphasis in original).
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